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Introduction
During the autumn of 1996 two official reports dealing with
what might broadly be described as substance misuse were
published in Dublin. One of these, National Alcohol Policy –
Ireland, which emanated from the then Department of Health
and was published by the Stationery Office, was a beautifully
produced document, reflecting the six years it had been in
preparation and the amount of drafting, editing and design work
put into its final format. The other, the awkwardly named First
Report of the Ministerial Task Force on Measures to Reduce the
Demand for Drugs (which will be referred to hereafter by its 
more common title as the ‘Rabbitte Report’), had been produced
in three months by a task force of seven ministers of state,
chaired by Pat Rabbitte, Minister of State to the Government.
Understandably, the Rabbitte Report was somewhat lacking in
production values: it had a lurid maroon cover, no ISBN, no
indication of which government department had published 
it and, at least to the academic reader, it bore a strong
resemblance to an undergraduate group project which had 
been cobbled together in desperate haste. However, to the joy of
those who argue that there is an inverse relationship between the
glossiness of an official report and its actual impact on public
policy, the Rabbitte Report had immediate and lasting effects
while the national alcohol policy proposals sank more or less
without trace. 
The aim of this paper, written on the occasion of Rabbitte’s tenth
birthday, is to revisit the report by examining its main
recommendations in the context of both the Irish drug policy
scene and the wider public policy arena of 1996, and by looking
critically at how it has influenced ongoing drug policy in this
country over the past decade.
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The Rabbitte Report: background and context
The historical evolution of recent public policy on illicit drugs in
Ireland – starting with what in retrospect was a relatively minor
matter of young people experimenting with ‘soft’ drugs in the
late-1960s, but changing radically with the advent of injecting
heroin use in Dublin from about 1980 onwards – has been
studied in detail elsewhere (Butler, 2002). From an ideological
perspective the major dilemma for Irish, as for all, drug policy
makers is to decide where and how explicitly to choose a place on
the spectrum of possible drug policy positions. At one end of this
spectrum there is the highly moralistic option of waging ‘a war
on drugs’, as favoured by the United States of America (Bewley-
Taylor, 1999) and as reflected in the international drug
conventions of the United Nations; increasingly, the middle
ground consists of the pragmatic preference for using strategies
such as methadone maintenance or needle exchange schemes for
injecting opiate users, which are simply aimed at reducing drug-
related harm while having no aspiration to the creation of a drug-
free society (Butler and Mayock, 2005); while, the other
extreme, which as yet has not been implemented anywhere, is the
libertarian ideal of legalising all psychoactive drugs, thereby
leaving individual citizens free to use drugs if they so wish but
also with personal responsibility for problems arising from such
drug use (Szasz, 1992). From a more mundane administrative
perspective, and particularly as research evidence has
accumulated about the range of personal and environmental
factors which contribute to problem drug use (Advisory Council
on the Misuse of Drugs, 1998), one of the most difficult tasks for
national governments has been to integrate or ‘join up’ the
efforts of all governmental sectors which can be seen to have a
legitimate contribution to make to drug policy. 
The circumstances which led to the establishment of the
Rabbitte task force in mid-1996 seem, in retrospect at least,
reasonably clear. At this time Ireland was just about to assume
the Presidency of the European Union, and one of the issues on
which it proposed to take a leadership role was drug policy.
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Domestically, however, Ireland did not appear to be well placed
to act as a role model for other EU countries; drug problems had
been a cause of concern in Ireland for almost thirty years and
Dublin was already sixteen years into its so-called ‘opiate
epidemic’, but neither the ‘top-down’ nor the ‘bottom-up’ drug
policy structures appeared to be working satisfactorily. From a
top-down perspective, the Department of Health had been
involved since 1972 in sporadic but ultimately fruitless attempts
to play a co-ordinating role in drug policy for the wide range of
statutory and voluntary bodies involved in this field; committees
based within the Department of Health and variously named the
Inter-Departmental Committee on Drugs, the National Co-
Ordinating Committee on Drug Abuse and the National Co-
Ordinating Committee on Drug Misuse had struggled
unsuccessfully over the years to keep all of the stakeholders
involved and committed on an ongoing basis to the drafting and
implementation of integrated policies appropriate to the
changing drug scene (Butler, 2002). Attempts of a bottom-up
nature to involve community and locally-based voluntary groups
in the policy process proved to be equally fraught. During the
first decade of Dublin’s heroin problem, the Eastern Health
Board (the statutory health authority for the city at this time)
had been implacably opposed to sharing power with community
groups from urban areas with a high prevalence of drug
problems, favouring instead preventive and treatment responses
which were centrally based and professionally delivered (Cullen,
1990). Even after such community-based activities had been
recommended in the Government Strategy to Prevent Drug Misuse
(1991) and after the Eastern Health Board had embarked on the
creation of a network of decentralised treatment services,
collaboration between the statutory authorities and the
community and voluntary sectors continued to be problematic;
for instance, a flagship attempt to create a community drug team
in Ballymun, as a partnership venture between the Eastern
Health Board and the Ballymun Youth Action Project, foundered
in a welter of confusion and mutual recrimination (Forrestal,
1996). Perhaps the government of the day, the ‘Rainbow
Coalition’ which was less than a year away from a general
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election, might have lived with this rumbling discontent about
its handling of drug policy had it not been for the murder in June
1996 of Veronica Guerin, an investigative journalist who had
written extensively of the drugs-crime nexus in Dublin. This
murder, which reinforced popular fears that the government had
lost control of the illicit drugs scene, seemed to be the catalyst for
a range of legislative and policy responses aimed at tackling
Dublin’s drug problem and reassuring the public about the
government’s determination in this regard. Many of these
responses, of which the creation of the Criminal Assets Bureau
was perhaps the best-known, were ‘supply-side’ initiatives, using
criminal justice sanctions in an effort to cut off or at least reduce
potential users’ access to illicit drugs. However, in recognition of
the fact that such supply-side initiatives were unlikely to lead to
total victory in this ‘war on drugs’, the government also
established the Rabbitte task force, charging it with the task of
making recommendations on ‘measures to reduce the demand
for drugs’. 
In addition to understanding the general context within which it
was set up, it is also important to identify the specific policy
influences which were to make an impact on the Rabbitte group
over the course of its brief working life; in retrospect, there
appear to have been two such influences – one primarily in the
sphere of central government and one of a grass-roots or civil
society nature – which merit discussion here. 
During the early 1990s the broad issue of public sector reform,
and the desirability of introducing management systems
associated with the private sector, returned to prominence in
Ireland; fortuitously, just two months prior to the setting up of
the Rabbitte task force a second report on the Strategic
Management Initiative (SMI), Ireland’s version of what is
commonly described as New Public Management, had been
published by the senior civil servants with responsibility for
introducing these reforms into Irish public sector management.
The report in question, Delivering Better Government (1996),
while generally focusing on the necessity to have clearly stated
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policy objectives which should be achieved with the use of
evidence-based strategies, looked specifically and in some detail
at complex policy issues which could not be managed or resolved
within ‘the functional remit and skill base of a single Department
or Agency’ (14). This report referred to these as ‘cross-
departmental’ issues (in subsequent policy debate it became
more common to describe them as ‘cross-cutting’ issues),
suggesting that traditional public service culture and structures
encouraged central government departments and other statutory
agencies to defend their own interests and work in isolation from
one another, rather than to collaborate in managing these policy
issues which cut across existing agency boundaries. As a means of
improving public sector responses to these cross-cutting issues,
Delivering Better Government recommended the creation of the
following dedicated structures: 
● cabinet sub-committees to deal with specific complex issues; 
● nominated ‘lead’ departments to play a co-ordinating role for
such issues; 
● allocation of responsibility for policy co-ordination to a
specific minister or minister of state within the ‘lead’
department; 
● ‘cross-cutting’ teams or structures with specific responsibility
for ongoing management of the policy issue in question. 
The drugs issue was one of those complex policy issues identified
as appropriate for the development of this new approach to
policy co-ordination. 
The second policy influence which was to prove important for
Rabbitte and his committee was the emergence of a community-
based movement known as the Inter-Agency Drugs Project
(IADP) within the north inner-city of Dublin. Other grassroots
anti-drugs movements, such as Concerned Parents Against
Drugs (CPAD) which had operated through the 1980s or the
Coalition of Communities Against Drugs (COCAD) which was
active during the mid-1990s, had been controversial in that their
attempts to create informal policing systems had drawn them
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into regular conflict with statutory health, justice and housing
authorities, with the anti-drug activists being described as
‘vigilantes’ (Bennett, 1988; Lyder, 2005). The IADP, however,
had its origins within a broader community development
movement, the Inner City Organisations Network (ICON) and,
while not averse to organising public protest, was less adversarial
and philosophically more amenable to working with statutory
bodies within the then dominant social partnership movement
(O’Donnell and Thomas, 1998). 
The Rabbitte Report: recommendations and
implementation
The somewhat muddled format of the Rabbitte Report reflected
the speed with which it was produced and the sense of urgency
felt by those ministers of state responsible for its production.
However, in terms of its content, there were two main,
interrelated themes which emerged most clearly from this
document: one of these was the acknowledgement that problem
drug use could not be explained satisfactorily in individual terms
but must be considered in relation to wider structural factors,
including poverty, educational disadvantage, unemployment,
high localised crime rates and housing difficulties; the second
was the need to create policy structures which on an ongoing
basis would recognise and respond appropriately to the
complexity of drug-related problems. 
A decade later, the decision to view heroin problems in the
context of what is now commonly referred to as ‘social exclusion’
may seem mundane and self-evident, but it should be borne in
mind that despite strong, supporting epidemiological evidence,
Irish policy makers had never previously accepted this
perspective in such an explicit or unequivocal way. The idea that
heroin problems could validly be seen as just one of the many
faces of urban poverty was argued throughout the Rabbitte
Report, but most emphatically perhaps in the chairman’s single-
page preface, supported by an appendix (Appendix 3) which
mapped the geographic distribution of people receiving
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treatment for drug problems in the Dublin area. In his brief
preface, Rabbitte argued forthrightly that Ireland’s drug problem
was essentially a heroin problem existing in those local authority
housing estates in Dublin where, borrowing the words of the
political philosopher Hobbes, he described life as having become
‘nasty, brutish and short’. Appendix 3 simply used colour-coded
maps which provided graphic proof that treated drug misuse was
not randomly distributed across Dublin, but instead clustered in
areas designated as socially disadvantaged. The epidemiological
data summarised in these maps could not conceivably be
regarded as new, since the linkage between social deprivation and
heroin use had consistently been evident in the data produced by
the Health Research Board’s reporting system on treated drug
misuse in Dublin (e.g. O’Higgins, 1996). Indeed the very first
prevalence study of heroin use in Dublin (Dean, Bradshaw and
Lavelle, 1983) – carried out during 1982 and 1983 by the
Medico-Social Research Board, a forerunner of the Health
Research Board – had expressed sentiments very similar to those
of Rabbitte, concluding that:
[I]t is difficult not to think that these young people in North
Central Dublin are the victims of society. They live in a dirty,
squalid, architecturally dispiriting area; education seems to
provide no mode of escape; unemployment is their almost
inevitable lot … crime the societal norm; imprisonment more
likely than not; heroin taking is regarded as commonplace by
quite young children; current treatment and rehabilitation
seem to hold little in the way of answers to their heroin abuse.
(26-27)
Following this first prevalence study in 1983, the government of
the day established a Special Governmental Task Force on Drug
Abuse which, like the Rabbitte committee, consisted of ministers
of state who quickly submitted their report to government.
However, the government did not publish the full report of this
task force and it was not until several years later, when it was
leaked to interested parties, that it became apparent that the
government had ignored its primary ideological thrust – which
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was to view problem drug use as primarily determined by
environmental factors and to recommend selective targeting of
resources at identified, high-risk urban areas. Instead, official
policy on drug issues was largely dominated for the next decade
by individualistic ideas which purported to explain problem drug
use by reference to poor decision making by individuals who, for
a variety of poorly-understood reasons, opted to use dangerous
drugs (Butler, 1991, 139-143). 
In addition to this decision to approach problem drug use from
the perspective of social exclusion, the other major theme of the
Rabbitte Report was that dealing with the necessity to create
policy structures which might effectively co-ordinate all of the
various stakeholders involved in this sphere. The range of
governmental sectors which had been identified as relevant to
drug policy was reflected in the makeup of the Rabbite
committee, whose members represented such diverse interests as
health, child care, education, youth and community work, social
welfare, local government and housing; the absence of a minister
of state representing the criminal justice sector, which has always
played a key role in enforcing misuse of drugs legislation, may be
explained by reference to the fact that this was a committee
which was concerned with demand reduction rather than supply
reduction, but is nonetheless noteworthy. In any event, Rabbitte
drew explicitly on the SMI proposals already referred to in
framing its policy structures: 
The drugs problem is what the Strategic Management
Initiative in the Public Services describes as a ‘cross-cutting’
issue which cannot be dealt with satisfactorily by any one
Department. A large number of Departments and their
supporting agencies are directly involved in the fight to reduce
both the supply and demand for drugs. If the programmes and
services which they provide are to be delivered in an effective,
efficient manner, it is absolutely essential that practical and
workable arrangements be put in place to ensure a coherent,
co-ordinated approach (First Report of the Ministerial Task
Force on Measures to Reduce the Demand for Drugs, 12).
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Drawing on this management philosophy, Rabbitte went on to
propose what was described as a ‘matrix of structural
arrangements for delivery of services’ (21) consisting of three
layers: a Cabinet Drugs Committee, to be chaired by the
Taoiseach; a ‘cross-cutting’ National Drugs Strategy Team,
consisting of senior personnel from relevant government
departments, related executive agencies and representatives from
the voluntary and community sectors; and eleven Local Drugs
Task Forces (LDTFs) to integrate policy and practice in those
areas identified as having a high prevalence of problem drug use.
As can be seen, these proposed arrangements were intended to
combine top-down features – and there can be no higher policy
structure than a cabinet committee – with bottom-up structures
in the shape of LDTFs, aimed at facilitating the involvement of
local residents in partnership with locally-based representatives
of statutory services. In recommending the creation of the
LDTFs Rabbitte drew explicitly upon the experience of the
Citywide campaign, declaring itself ‘impressed with the positive
impact of the Inter-Agency Drug Project in Dublin’s North
Inner City (45)’. Ideologically, the creation of LDTFs – which
would serve as vehicles for selectivist or targeted funding of drug
prevention initiatives in those areas identified by the epidemiolo-
gists as being most vulnerable to drug problems – was a practical
reflection of this new political willingness to see drug problems
in structural rather individualistic than terms. Thus, rather than
blaming socially excluded urban dwellers for their folly in using
the most risky drugs in the most risky ways, the government was
now proposing to invest in a broad range of policy measures
which, by generally tackling social exclusion, might specifically
lead to a reduction in the prevalence of such drug use. 
These recommendations were quite radical but equally
impressive was the determination of the political system to move
ahead quickly with their implementation. The Rainbow
Coalition and the Fianna Fail/Progressive Democrats coalition
which replaced it in the early summer of 1997 appeared to share
a sense of political urgency with regard to drug policy, and by the
end of this year the Local Drugs Task Forces had been established
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and many other features of what was to become known as the
National Drugs Strategy had been set in place. The main
structures within this national policy framework were: 
● a Cabinet Committee on Social Inclusion – which was
nominally different from what Rabbitte had recommended
but which reinforced the ideological shift towards viewing
serious drug problems from the perspective of social exclusion; 
● a ‘lead’ department, initially the Department of Tourism,
Sport and Recreation but, following the reordering of central
government departments in 2002, the Department of
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs which went on set
up its own Drugs Strategy Unit ; 
● a minister of state who was allocated special responsibility for
the National Drugs Strategy within this ‘lead’ department; 
● the establishment of a ‘cross-cutting’ National Drugs Strategy
Team (NDST), made up of representatives of central
government departments and other statutory bodies as well as
representatives from the community and voluntary sectors; 
● an Inter-Departmental Group on Drugs (IDG) (consisting of
senior civil servants) which advises the Cabinet Committee on
Social Inclusion and monitors the overall implementation of
drug policy.
In 2001, following an extensive process of review and
consultation, these basic structures were retained and
incorporated into a new and formally designated National Drugs
Strategy based upon a new policy document Building on
Experience: National Drugs Strategy 2001-2008. This document,
which was a model of managerialism, set out detailed aims and
objectives, specified actions considered necessary for the
attainment of these aims and objectives, and identified the
agencies which were deemed accountable for carrying out these
actions. Time-frames and key performance indicators were also
provided for this strategy which was described as resting upon
four ‘pillars’: supply reduction, prevention (a somewhat ambiguous
phrase which referred to education and public awareness),
treatment and research. In 2005 a mid-term review of the
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implementation of the strategy was completed and published
(Mid-term Review of the National Drugs Strategy 2001-2008,
2005), again presenting its findings in managerial terms on the
degree to which the various actions had been achieved. This mid-
term review was broadly positive of the way in which the strategy
was working, while also concluding that ‘some adjustments are
required in order to refocus priorities and accelerate the roll-
out and implementation of the various key actions in the
remaining period of the Strategy up to 2008’ (62; bold in
original). It was recommended specifically that the existing four
pillars should be added to through the creation of a new
‘rehabilitation’ pillar (62). By the time the mid-term review was
conducted, progress had been made on creating Regional Drugs
Task Forces based within the previously existing regional health
board areas, to complement the work of the existing Local Drugs
Task Forces – which operated in smaller urban areas with a high
prevalence of problem drug use and which by this time had been
funded for two rounds of ‘action plans’ at this local level. 
National Drugs Strategy: a shaky edifice?
Ten years on, it is clear that the impressive edifice which is our
National Drugs Strategy – with its pillars, multi-layered and
cross-cutting structures and general appearance of effective and
efficient management – had its origins in the Rabbitte Report of
1996. However, whether one should accept at face value that this
strategy has been shown by independent evaluation to be largely
successful in attaining its goals of delivering joined-up and
effective responses to the problems of illicit drug use is
considerably less clear. 
Over the past century and in all countries which have developed
public policy responses to drugs, the dominant and abiding
tension has been between two conflicting perspectives: one based
within a healthcare or therapeutic paradigm and the other within
a criminal justice or legal paradigm. In the former, drug users are
viewed as pathological and in need of therapy, while in the latter
they are viewed as immoral rule-breakers deserving of exemplary
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criminal justice sanctions. More than thirty years ago, Gusfield
(1975), writing of American public policy on drugs, referred to
this as ‘the conflict of tough versus tender attitudes towards drug
users (11)’: a conflict which, as he pointed out, could not be
resolved by research or the input of scientific experts. Even a
cursory glance at how Irish criminal justice policy on drugs has
evolved over the past decade, makes it obvious that our National
Drugs Strategy has failed to resolve this conflict. Although the
broad thrust of Irish drug policy during this period has been
increasingly ‘tender’, as exemplified by expanded healthcare
services for problem drug users and by the application of the
social exclusion perspective to this issue, criminal justice policy
has remained resolutely ‘tough’. One example of this toughness
is to be found in the Criminal Justice Act, 1999, introduced by
Minister John O’Donoghue, which provided for mandatory
minimum sentences of ten years for persons convicted of being
in possession of drugs valued at €12,700 or more; if
implemented by the judiciary (which in the main appears not to
have been the case to date), this would impose very severe jail
sentences not only, perhaps not even primarily, on high-level
drug dealers, but also on low-level dealers quite likely to be
themselves drug dependent. When Minister for Justice, Equality
and Law Reform, Minister Michael McDowell not only
fulminated regularly against the evils of drug use but resisted the
introduction of harm reduction strategies into the prison system;
in 2004, responding to a specific suggestion by public health
advocates that drug-using prisoners might be provided with
needle exchange facilities such as are available to drug users who
are not in prison, he denounced this suggestion as ‘moral
fuzziness’ (Irish Times, September 29, 2004). From a strategic
management perspective, what is striking about Minister
McDowell’s proposal to create drug-free prisons (Department of
Justice, Equality and Law Reform Press Release, November 21,
2005) is not so much the moral absolutism upon which it is
based or the fact that the proposal seems impracticable, but that
it represents an old-fashioned ‘departmental’ policy initiative, a
solo run taken outside of and without reference to the cross-
cutting structures now in place. In short, traditional ideological
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and institutional conflict as to how the state should
conceptualise and manage illicit drug users does not appear to
have been altered in any significant way by the creation of the
new managerial approach to drug policy. 
Similarly, when one looks at the operation of the LDTFs, the
bottom-up structures intended to integrate the activities of
statutory agencies and community/voluntary groupings in those
areas with an identified high prevalence of drug-related
problems, it is not difficult to discern tensions between these
locally based structures and the state. The scale of preventive and
treatment activities carried out at this level, as well as the scale of
government investment, was made clear by the Taoiseach, Bertie
Ahern, in his address to a conference on LDTFs held in October,
2005, when he noted that: ‘Since 1997 nearly [€]200 million
has been allocated and spent on this work across the LDTF areas’
(Vital Connections: Local Drugs Task Forces – Leading the response
(Conference Report), 2006, 3). While the mid-term review of the
National Drugs Strategy, in common with a number of earlier
evaluations of their performance, was broadly positive about the
LDTFs, it must be acknowledged that all of these evaluations
tend to be qualitative and descriptive rather than providing hard,
quantifiable evidence of effectiveness – thereby legitimating
indefinite funding of these locally-based initiatives. Community
activists appear to have become increasingly uneasy about their
participation in LDTFs, sensing that top-down governmental
commitment to these structures – and perhaps to the National
Drugs Strategy as a whole – has waned in recent years. For
instance, the fact that the last Minister for State with
responsibility for the National Drugs Strategy also had
ministerial responsibilities in another department is regarded by
some as evidence of a diminished governmental commitment to
the drugs issue. Similarly, proposals to have LDTF projects, at
present receiving dedicated funding negotiated through the
NDST, mainstreamed – which refers to the process of trans-
ferring funding responsibility for such projects back to the
appropriate central government department or agency – is
viewed with apprehension by some stakeholders in the
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community and voluntary sector. These tensions were brought
sharply into focus in late 2005 by the resignation from the
NDST of Fergus McCabe, who had been involved ten years
earlier in the creation of the Citywide campaign (which had
served as a template for the local drugs task forces) and who had
been the community sector representative on the NDST since its
inception. Just as the broader community and voluntary sector
may be prone to doubts over its participation in social
partnership arrangements (Murphy, 2002; Meade, 2005),
wondering whether it has not been bought off by state largesse so
that its radical credentials have been terminally damaged, the
community drug sector may also be experiencing some nostalgia
for the days when its relationship with the state was more
adversarial. 
Rabbitte’s achievement: a conclusion
In trying to form final judgements on drug policy developments
over the past decade, it is useful to refer back to the national
alcohol policy report published at the same time as the Rabbitte
Report and to ask why this alcohol policy document failed to
lead to any significant implementation of a different style of
public policy on alcohol. The answer to this question seems quite
straightforward: the political system did not adopt the public
health strategies recommended in the 1996 national alcohol
policy report because to do so would have entailed open conflict
with the drinks industry, possible job losses and loss of revenue,
as well as serious risk of electoral unpopularity. In short, political
leaders and senior public sector managers decided that the
economic and political tensions inherent in the adoption of such
a public health approach outweighed its scientific merit; it
should be pointed out that English policy makers followed a
similar line (Room, 2004). Although it does not bring the state
into conflict with any legitimate business interests, the challenge
in relation to the use of illicit drugs is no less complex, involving
as it does the task of maintaining balance between the conflicting
criminal justice and healthcare paradigms. It may well be that
there is no ultimate resolution of this tension between the
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criminal justice perspective, which argues its case in the strident,
moralistic language of the ‘war on drugs’, and the healthcare
perspective which operates from pragmatic, harm reduction
premises. One of the most striking characteristics of
managerialism (Clarke, 2004; Dent, Chandler and Barry, 2004)
is that it exaggerates consensus and depoliticises contentious
political issues, and this perhaps has been the principal
achievement of Rabbitte: it bypassed contentious ideological
debate, opting instead to present the ‘drug problem’ as an issue
best tackled through the use of modern management techniques,
allegedly the norm in the private sector. 
Prior to the Rabbitte Report, the style of drug policy making in
Ireland was sometimes described, informally and perhaps
politically incorrectly, as ‘epileptic’: a reference to the fact that
there were long periods of almost total quiescence interspersed
with frenzied bursts of activity. Through its introduction of a
managerial philosophy and accompanying structures, Rabbitte
has effectively created a more normalised and routinised style of
drug policy making. The underlying ideological issues have not
been resolved; the structures are precarious; and the policy
process is by no means as rational or as ‘evidence-based’ as is
implied. None of these caveats should, however, take from what
was a considerable achievement in assembling structures which
have long survived the crisis that led to their creation. 
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